DRC CONFLICT! Here is why Wazalendo Militia remains a threat to regional stability despite peace agreements
BY DEFRAISE ENOSH MUHINDO
On June 27, 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed a historic peace agreement in Washington, facilitated by the United States, aimed at ending decades of conflict in eastern DRC.
The accord, focusing on neutralizing the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the withdrawal of Rwanda’s “defensive measures,” marks a step toward de-escalation. However, it notably omits any mention of the Wazalendo, pro-government militias backed by Kinshasa as stated by President Tshisekedi praising them as “Patriots and Fighters” in his speech of 30th Jun 2025.
Their controversial role and alliances particularly with the FDLR and the Burundian army raise concerns about regional stability. This article explores their impact, origins, and the challenges posed by their exclusion from the agreement, drawing on international reports, media analyses, and the testimony of a local resident who are living in the conflict zones.
Who are the Wazalendo?
“The Wazalendo are definitely a negative force. I believe the joint forces of UPDF and FARDC will attack them wherever we find them. Unless, they are clever enough to surrender,” said General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, Chief of Uganda People Defense Forces in his tweet posted on X (formerly Twitter) on June 22, 2025.
The term “Wazalendo,” meaning “patriots” in Swahili, refers to a coalition of armed groups and volunteers mobilized to support the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) against the M23 rebel movement and the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC-M23).
Emerging in a structured form in 2022 following the M23’s resurgence, the Wazalendo include local militias such as the Nyatura, APCLS, CMC-FDP, and elements of the FDLR.
Alongside youths, responding to President Félix Tshisekedi’s call in a 2022 televised address, Tshisekedi urged Congolese youth to defend the nation against what Kinshasa describes as “Rwandan aggression” through the M23.
A local witness, who grew up and living in North Kivu, describes the Wazalendo as an alliance of armed groups that, prior to the M23’s rise, were already responsible for insecurity, chaos, and devastation.
“These militias propagated a tribalist ideology, particularly targeting Rwandophone communities, especially Tutsis/Banyamulenge, often mistaken for Rwandans,” he states. He adds that many so-called “volunteers” in Wazalendo are marginalized youths, sometimes delinquents or bandits who joined these groups to gain access to weapons and legitimize their illicit activities under the guise of patriotism. This view is echoed on social media, where many congolese users describe the Wazalendo as a “ticking time bomb” due to their lack of training, ethics and the untraceable proliferation of arms.
The Wazalendo often operate alongside the FDLR, a Hutu Rwandan armed group founded by former perpetrators of the 1994 genocide, which Rwanda views as an existential threat. A UN experts’ report published on July 2, 2025, confirms that the FARDC continue to use the FDLR and Wazalendo as proxy forces against the M23, despite Kinshasa’s commitments to end such support.
The report notes a “close coordination” between FDLR and Wazalendo commanders, complicating efforts to neutralize them. Martin Ziakwau, a lecturer in international relations at the Catholic University of Congo, warns that this collaboration could undermine the FDLR’s neutralization, a key pillar of the Washington agreement.
The involvement of Burundi, under President Évariste Ndayishimiye, adds further complexity. Local sources and analysts suggest that the Burundian army, present in eastern DRC to combat M23, coordinates with the Wazalendo and FDLR.
This alliance, perceived as supporting efforts to destabilize Rwanda, fuels regional tensions. The local witness claims that this dynamic, backed by Kinshasa and Gitega, exacerbates rivalries between the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi, threatening the implementation of the peace agreement.
Signed on June 27, 2025, the DRC-Rwanda peace agreement, mediated by the United States and Qatar, mandates the neutralization of the FDLR within three months and the withdrawal of Rwandan “defensive measures,” a euphemism for Rwandan troop presence in eastern DRC.
A Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM) is to be established by July 27 to oversee these operations. However, the agreement remains silent on the Wazalendo, despite their central role in the conflict and their ties to the FDLR.
This omission raises concerns. Bernabé Milinganyo, a Congolese expert of politic issues, notes that the absence of references to the Wazalendo, while targeting the FDLR, is seen as an “unfair compromise” by many Congolese.
The Wazalendo, operating in areas controlled by the FARDC, could serve as a refuge for FDLR fighters or even integrate with the Burundian army, complicating their demobilization.
Analysts warn that this gap could reignite tensions between the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi, particularly if the Wazalendo continue their abuses or refuse to disarm, which will create tensions in the region.
While some view the Wazalendo as “heroes” defending their land, they face serious accusations of abuses. A Human Rights Watch report from May 23, 2025, documents murders, looting, children recruitment and ethnically motivated violence against the Batutsi-Banyamulenge, a Congolese community notably in Kivu in February 2025.
These acts, often fueled by anti-Rwandophone rhetoric, deepen ethnic divides. The local witness corroborates these claims, highlighting the Wazalendo’s hostile ideology toward Tutsis, which fosters community mistrust.
Demobilizing the Wazalendo poses a significant challenge. The group’s lack of training, ethic and uncontrolled access to weapons complicates these efforts. The defection of some Wazalendo factions, such as the FPP-AP, to the AFC-M23 in March 2025, underscores their volatility and potential to further destabilize the region.
The Washington agreement, hailed by the UN and leaders like Emmanuel Macron as a “historic step,” remains fragile. The lack of a clear plan to neutralize or demobilize the Wazalendo, combined with their ties to the FDLR and the Burundian army, fuels fears of failure.
If the FDLR merges with the Wazalendo or benefits from Burundian support, the region could face renewed tensions between the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi. Analysts like Professor Philippe Doudou Kaganda highlight the FDLR’s deep social roots, through marriages, children born in the DRC and their persistent ideology as obstacles to neutralization.
For the agreement to succeed, experts call for clearer definitions of “neutralization” and sustained international pressure, particularly from the United States, to ensure compliance. Without effective demobilization of the Wazalendo and management of regional tensions, peace in the Great Lakes region and East Africa risks remaining elusive.
At the end, a precarious balance is needed.
The Wazalendo embody the contradictions of a conflict where patriotism, opportunism, and ethnic rivalries intertwine. Their exclusion from the Washington agreement, despite their central role and controversial alliances, raises the specter of renewed tensions between the DRC, Rwanda, and Burundi. For communities in eastern DRC, as the local witness underscores, the Wazalendo are both a source of resistance and insecurity, leaving the region’s path to peace uncertain.
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