END OF AN ‘ERROR’?…THE TRUTH! Secrets Why Finance Trust Bank Fired CEO Nakawunde Mulindwa
Finance Trust Bank (FTB) is facing a fresh leadership storm after the institution announced the departure of its long-serving Managing Director, Annet Nakawunde Mulindwa, with insiders insisting that the official explanation does not tell the full story.
The bank announced on September 1 that Mulindwa will leave her position in November 2026.
The official line is that she is leaving to take up a new international leadership opportunity.
But behind the carefully worded announcement, sources familiar with developments at the bank told RedPepper that Mulindwa was fired (effectively pushed out).
The sources claim the board and shareholders had become increasingly frustrated with her performance.
They say targets were set—but repeatedly missed or only partially achieved.
And they say the final breaking point was the bank’s downgrade from a commercial bank to a Tier II credit institution.
“The bosses grew impatient. They set targets for her and she never met them fully. The downgrade to Tier II under her watch was the final straw. They could not put up with her anymore,” an insider told RedPepper.
The allegations paint a picture of a bank that grew substantially in size under Mulindwa but struggled to build enough capital, profitability and strategic strength to retain its commercial banking status.
And then came the failed Access Bank deal.
That deal was supposed to be the rescue.
It never happened.
FTB eventually lost its Tier I commercial banking status.
And now Mulindwa is leaving.
For insiders, the three events are closely connected.
FROM WOMEN’S BANK TO BANKING CRISIS
Finance Trust Bank did not begin as an ordinary commercial bank.
Its roots go back to 1984 when it was established as Uganda Women’s Finance Trust.
The institution was created around a social mission.
It sought to expand access to finance for women and low-income Ugandans.
Over the years, the institution evolved.
It became Uganda Finance Trust Limited.
It later operated as a Tier III microfinance institution.
Then came the biggest transformation.
In 2013, it obtained a commercial banking licence.
That was supposed to be the beginning of a new era.
Instead, the bank eventually found itself fighting to remain in the very category it had worked for years to enter.
Mulindwa became the face of the institution’s commercial banking era.
She has spent nearly 15 years at the helm.
During that period, the bank grew significantly.
According to financial figures cited by sources, total assets increased from approximately Shs92.2 billion in 2011 to about Shs668 billion in 2025.
Customer deposits also grew dramatically.
They rose from approximately Shs46.1 billion to Shs451.7 billion.
Loans and advances increased from roughly Shs46.1 billion to about Shs397 billion.
On the surface, those numbers tell a story of expansion.
But the board wanted more.
According to insiders, the board was looking beyond headline profits. Capital adequacy mattered. Growth quality mattered. Strategic positioning mattered. Regulatory compliance mattered.
And, above all, the bank needed to remain a commercial bank. The recovery in profits therefore did not erase the bigger problem.
The capital crisis remained and Mulindwa was to blame.
THE CAPITAL TIME BOMB
The Financial Institutions Act was amended in 2022.
One of the most important changes was an increase in the minimum paid-up capital requirement for commercial banks.
The threshold was raised from Shs120 billion to Shs150 billion.
For large banks, the increase was painful but manageable.
For smaller institutions, it was potentially existential.
FTB was among those caught in the middle.
It had customers. It had branches.
It had a growing loan book. It had deposits.
But it needed substantially more capital to remain in the commercial banking club.
Bank of Uganda gave institutions several possible routes.
They could raise capital. They could merge. They could sell. Or they could downgrade.
FTB initially fought to remain a commercial bank.
The pressure intensified.The bank looked for partners.
It pursued development finance arrangements.
It worked with institutions including aBi Trust, the East African Development Bank and the Grow Project.
Those arrangements helped support liquidity and business activity. But they did not solve the central problem.
The bank needed permanent capital.
And according to people familiar with the situation, Mulindwa and her team struggled to find a solution acceptable to the board and regulator.
That is when the biggest deal in the bank’s recent history entered the picture.
ENTER ACCESS BANK
In 2024, Nigeria’s Access Bank Group emerged as a potential saviour.
Access Bank proposed acquiring 80.89 percent of Finance Trust Bank.
For FTB, the deal appeared to solve almost everything.
It would bring in a powerful shareholder. It would inject fresh capital.
It would strengthen technology. It would give FTB access to a larger regional banking network.
Most importantly, it could save the institution from losing its commercial banking licence. The deal was publicly celebrated.
FTB announced the signing of a definitive agreement.
The transaction was subject to regulatory approvals from the Central Bank of Nigeria and Bank of Uganda.
Senior executives spoke enthusiastically about the future.
The proposed transaction was presented as a strategic partnership that would promote financial inclusion, women’s empowerment, technology integration and regional trade.
Mulindwa described the deal as transformative.
Access Bank leadership also presented it as an important step in its East African expansion.
Inside FTB, there was optimism. The bank appeared to have found its escape route. But the rescue never arrived.
Months passed. The transaction did not close. There was no takeover. There was no new capital injection.
There was no change of ownership. And the clock was ticking.
Sources now claim that Mulindwa came under increasing pressure to deliver the transaction.
According to insiders, the board expected management under Mulindwa to keep the deal alive and ensure that the bank remained commercially viable until the acquisition was completed.
That did not happen. The deal stalled.
The bank remained exposed to the capital requirements.
And Access Bank eventually moved ahead with other opportunities.
The development became particularly embarrassing when Access Bank completed its acquisition of National Bank of Kenya from KCB Group in May 2025.
That transaction, which had been pursued around the same period, actually closed.
Approvals were obtained. Ownership changed hands.
Access Bank strengthened its East African footprint.
FTB, meanwhile, remained stuck. To people close to the bank, this became a major source of frustration.
Some insiders interpreted the failed transaction as a vote of no confidence in the bank’s leadership under Mulindwa.
DOWNGRADE OR DIE
Eventually, the answer became clear. FTB would have to downgrade.
Bank of Uganda approved the transition of Finance Trust Bank from a Tier I commercial bank to a Tier II credit institution, effective April 1, 2026.
The decision was later publicly announced.
The downgrade was a devastating blow to the institution’s ambitions.
As a Tier II credit institution, FTB can continue accepting certain deposits and extending credit.
But it no longer enjoys the full range of activities associated with commercial banking.
Among the restrictions are the inability to operate cheque accounts and trade in foreign exchange.
The minimum capital requirement is also dramatically lower than that of a commercial bank.
The new threshold is Shs25 billion.
In simple terms, FTB had moved backwards.
The institution that had fought its way into commercial banking was now operating under a lower licence.
For the board, insiders say, this was unacceptable.
And Mulindwa was condemned to a sack.
THE WOMEN’S BANK QUESTION
There was another issue.
What exactly was Finance Trust Bank’s niche?
The institution had been founded around women’s financial empowerment.
That identity remained central to its history.
But critics within the banking industry questioned whether FTB had successfully turned that history into a powerful modern commercial strategy.
Sources told RedPepper that the bank under Mulindwa failed to develop a sufficiently distinctive women-focused product ecosystem.
Instead, it increasingly found itself competing with much larger commercial banks.
Those banks had deeper pockets.
They had stronger technology platforms.
They had bigger branch networks.
They had larger corporate customer bases.
And they had greater capacity to absorb shocks.
FTB, meanwhile, had to fight for market share with fewer resources.
By May 2024, the bank had 35 branches.
But branch numbers alone could not solve the capital problem.
The challenge was deeper.
The bank needed a clear competitive identity.
It needed capital.
It needed technology.
It needed profitable lending.
And it needed a strategy capable of turning its social mission into a commercially sustainable banking model.
According to critics, management under Mulindwa failed to provide the required transformation and she had to go.
THE COURT CASES STARTED PILING UP
There were also legal headaches under mulindwa tenure that did not amuse the bosses.
FTB has faced a number of court disputes.
One of the most damaging cases involved a Shs20 million loan issued to businessman Nkoto Jackson .
The loan was secured by land in Kibuku District.
According to the court proceedings, the motor vehicle that later became the centre of the dispute was not the agreed security for the loan.
Nkoto made his first repayment.
He later experienced financial difficulties.
The dispute escalated.
The bank’s agents allegedly seized his vehicle and detained him for several hours.
The matter ended up before the High Court.
Justice Dr Lubega Farouq delivered a scathing judgment.
The court found the bank and its agents had acted unlawfully in the recovery process.
The judgment awarded Nkoto Shs5 million in general damages.
He was also awarded Shs5 million in special damages.
Another Shs2 million was awarded as punitive damages.
Interest and legal costs were also ordered.
The bank’s counterclaim was dismissed.
The judgment carried a broader warning.
A borrower does not lose constitutional and legal protections simply because he has defaulted on a loan.
Banks must follow the law when recovering money.
For FTB, the case raised questions about internal controls.
It also raised questions about how aggressively the institution was pursuing loan recoveries.
Inside the bank, sources say such cases contributed to concerns about management.
THE SHS300 BILLION SANLAM BATTLE
Then came another major legal headache.
The Sanlam dispute involved a much larger figure.
Approximately Shs300 billion in loans became entangled in a battle involving allegedly defective property valuations.
At the centre of the dispute were Katuramu & Company Consulting Surveyors.
The surveyors had carried out valuations used in connection with loans issued by Finance Trust Bank.
The bank later alleged that some of the valuation reports were seriously defective.
The allegations included inaccurate identification of plots.
There were claims that graveyards had been overlooked.
There were also claims that reports stated that buildings existed on land where there were allegedly no such buildings.
The bank argued that it relied on the valuations when issuing loans.
When borrowers subsequently defaulted, the bank was left exposed.
Katuramu & Company later admitted negligence in relation to the valuations.
That admission became a major part of the dispute.
But another fight followed.
Sanlam General Insurance, which insured the surveyors, resisted the bank’s claim.
Sanlam argued, among other things, that Finance Trust Bank was not a party to the insurance contract and therefore could not enforce the policy.
The matter first went before the Insurance Regulatory Authority Tribunal.
The tribunal ruled in favour of Finance Trust Bank and ordered Sanlam to pay approximately Shs1.9 billion.
Sanlam challenged that decision in the High Court.
Justice Patricia Kahigi Asiimwe subsequently overturned the tribunal decision.
The ruling found that Finance Trust Bank did not have the legal right to enforce the insurance policy because it was not a party to the contract.
The bank has appealed.
FTB has argued that the decision creates a wider problem for professional indemnity insurance.
The bank’s position is that financial institutions rely on professionals such as valuers and surveyors when assessing security.
If those professionals make negligent mistakes, banks need meaningful protection.
But the court dispute exposed another uncomfortable question.
How much due diligence should a bank conduct before relying on external valuations?
And how much responsibility should remain with the bank itself?
Critics used the case to question FTB’s internal controls.
Insiders say the board was unhappy.
Again, Mulindwa’s management was placed under scrutiny and the clock was ticking.
THEN CAME THE SHS6 BILLION DIGITAL HEIST
If the capital crisis and court battles were damaging, the alleged cyber fraud was explosive.
Finance Trust Bank suffered a major electronic fraud incident in April 2026.
According to prosecution allegations, approximately Shs6 billion was stolen from the bank’s systems between April 3 and April 8.
The money was allegedly moved through a complex network of mobile money accounts.
Prosecutors said the funds were channelled through 133 accounts.
Fifty-three were linked to MTN Mobile Money.
Eighty were linked to Airtel Money.
The case sent shockwaves through the bank.
It was not simply the amount involved.
The biggest concern was how the perpetrators allegedly managed to penetrate the bank’s core banking environment.
Eight suspects were subsequently remanded to Luzira Prison following proceedings at Buganda Road Chief Magistrates Court.
They included Travies Nakabbunge. Ernest Mulindwa, also known as Abbas. Robert Kaweesi. Robert Kisitu, alias Digital. Rwandan national Nicholas Ssekyanzi. Sister Kyoheirwe from Ntungamo. Doreen Nantale, alias Vanesa. And Amos Lyada, an infrastructure security analyst.
They face allegations including electronic fraud, theft and conspiracy to commit a felony.
The suspects are not guilty unless convicted by court.
But the case raised serious questions.
How did criminals allegedly access the system?
How did they move billions of shillings?
How did the transactions pass through multiple accounts?
And were insiders involved?
Investigators reportedly examined possible internal involvement.
The investigation also widened towards a third-party service provider.
That created another headache.
Modern banks depend heavily on external technology providers. Payment processors. Software providers. IT contractors. Cloud systems. Security companies.
A vulnerability in one partner can expose an entire bank.
Cybersecurity experts have repeatedly warned that third-party access is becoming one of the biggest risks facing financial institutions.
In FTB’s case, the alleged fraud therefore became more than a criminal investigation.
It became a management issue under Mulindwa.
The board needed answers. Customers needed reassurance. Regulators needed explanations.
And management needed to demonstrate that the bank’s systems were secure.
Sources say the incident added to the pressure surrounding Mulindwa.
INSIDER THEFT QUESTIONS
There were also concerns about internal controls.
Sources claim that management under Mulindwa faced criticism over alleged insider theft, digital fraud and weaknesses in internal systems.
These remain allegations.
But they were serious enough to attract attention within the institution.
The question for the board was simple.
Could management under Mulindwa prevent the bank from being penetrated from within?
Could it detect suspicious transactions quickly?
Could it protect customer funds?
Could it control employees and third-party service providers with access to sensitive systems?
The alleged Shs6 billion fraud put all those questions under the microscope.
And because it happened after the bank had already suffered the humiliation of a regulatory downgrade, the timing could hardly have been worse.
CONCERNS OVER OUTSIDE BUSINESS DEALINGS
There is another line of inquiry that RedPepper is still pursuing.
Sources claim that some people within FTB had become uncomfortable with Mulindwa’s alleged dealings outside the bank.
They claim she was linked to a private financial institution or financial venture, including allegations involving money lending or SACCO-related activities. There is no suggestion in this report that the alleged outside interests were illegal.
But sources claim the board was concerned about whether such interests created distractions or potential conflicts.
They questioned whether the CEO’s attention was fully focused on rebuilding FTB.
These allegations have not been independently established. RedPepper is still investigating them and findings will be in our subsequent publication.
THE BOSS HAD HAD ENOUGH
By the time the downgrade happened, the relationship between management under Mulindwa and the board had reportedly become strained.
The bank had failed to secure the capital needed to remain commercial.
The Access Bank rescue had collapsed.
The institution had suffered serious legal disputes.
There were concerns over internal controls.
Then came the cyber fraud.
And all this happened while the bank was trying to redefine itself after losing its commercial banking licence.
For insiders, the board’s patience had run out.
The bank’s official announcement therefore came as a carefully packaged departure.
Mulindwa was not publicly presented as a CEO being fired.
Instead, she was described as leaving to pursue an international leadership opportunity.
But sources insist the reality was different.
They say the decision was effectively a termination.
They say the international opportunity provided a convenient way of managing the exit.
And they say the board wanted to avoid creating further instability at a bank already under pressure.
One banking industry source described the situation bluntly. The argument, according to the source, is that FTB did not collapse overnight. It weakened gradually. Capital pressure built. Strategic options narrowed. The rescue deal failed. Regulatory pressure increased.
And eventually the commercial banking licence was surrendered.
That sequence, insiders say, made Mulindwa’s position increasingly difficult to defend.
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